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Formalities and Tiered Copyright Protection 
Prof. Jim Gibson, University of Richmond School of Law 
May 18, 2010 
In my last IP Issues entry, I discussed the advantages of reinstating formalities as prerequisites to 
copyright protection.  In this entry, I will suggest one way in which this reinstatement might take 
place. 
For most of modern copyright law’s existence, a work of expression received copyright 
protection only if the author complied with several formalities, such as registering the work with 
a government agency and placing a copyright notice on each copy of the work (the ubiquitous C-
in-a-circle). 
These formalities served two functions.  The first is what I call the “threshold” function: They 
gave the author a chance to demonstrate his or her desire for copyright protection.  The rationale 
was that if an author could not be bothered to expend the minimal effort to register a work or 
include a notice on published copies, then he or she was clearly uninterested in obtaining legal 
protection.  Non-compliant works would simply enter the public domain. 
The second function of formalities is what I call the “informational” function: Formalities 
provided useful information about the work.  The registration formality made it easier for 
potential licensees to track down the owner of the copyright and offer a licensing deal.  The 
notice formality likewise provided useful ownership information, and it also gave the public 
some information about how long the copyright would last and warned users that the work was 
protected. 
One problem with formalities was that these two functions were conflated, despite their different 
goals.  In theory, the threshold function should have been extremely easy for an author to fulfill, 
because all it called for was some unequivocal declaration of interest in copyright 
protection.  But the informational function called for more; its goals would not be met without 
the inclusion of a notice on every copy and the provision of accurate and comprehensive data 
about who owned the copyright.  Courts that were focused on the informational function would 
therefore be exacting about compliance, which meant that authors who were interested only in 
the threshold function (i.e., using copyright to protect their works) would find themselves 
without protection because of a failure to comply with the greater demands of the informational 
function (e.g., including a copyright notice on each and every published copy). 
Therefore, if we are to reinstate formalities, we should do so with an eye toward decoupling 
these functions, to the extent possible.  One way to do so would be to establish tiers of copyright 
protection. 
Consider, for example, a work that fails to comply with any formality.  The law might deny it 
protection entirely, as used to be the case.  After all, the author of such a work is apparently 
uninterested in exploiting the commercial advantages that copyright has to offer.  But the law 
might instead take a lesson from data that suggest that attribution (i.e., credit for being the 
author) is what matters most to the noncommercial author.  So instead of working a forfeiture, 
the law might simply limit the noncompliant work to some sort of attribution right; the only 
available remedy for infringement would be an injunction ordering the defendant to give proper 
attribution or hyperlink to the originating source. 
The next tier might comprise works that comply with some low-cost, author-friendly threshold 
formality.  These works too would get a limited attribution remedy, but the law might also grant 
them protection against direct, pay-per-copy or pay-per-performance commercial exploitation, 
with injunctive relief or actual damages available against the infringer. 
Finally, the highest tier would be reserved for those who fully comply with information-
providing formalities: registration (both for the work’s creation and for subsequent transfers), 
and notice on all available copies and performances.  That would get them the full lineup of 
copyright rights that exist today, including statutory damages and preliminary and permanent 
injunctions. 
This proposal raises a number of issues.  For example, would this kind of system exacerbate the 
existing power imbalance between well-informed big media companies and small-time authors 
who are less aware of these sorts of legal intricacies?  And what about international treaty 
obligations, which are unfriendly to formalities in any form?  Those seeking answers to these 
questions, however, will have to wait until a future entry in IP Issues. 
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